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A B S T R A C T
Recent theoretical studies question the view that the Euro-
pean Commission is a preference outlier. This paper
addresses this question by discussing the composition of
the European College of Commissioners and by focusing on
the appointment process. The analysis is based on a data
set that contains biographical information for all Com-
missioners since 1958. The analysis highlights the import-
ance of Commissioners’ party affiliation and their previous
political positions. Multivariate regression analysis shows
that smaller member states have tended to send more high-
ranking politicians to the College of Commissioners than
have larger member states. However, party affiliation has
not become more important as an appointment criterion.
What has changed with time has been not the party link but
the calibre of positions held by Commissioners before they
are appointed to the College.
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Introduction
The European Commission is a central political actor in the political system
of the European Union (EU). It holds the monopoly to initiate legislation and
can bring charges against member states before the European Court of Justice.
As the bureaucracy in charge of initiating legislation, it often enjoys infor-
mational advantages vis-à-vis the member states. For a long time, the
Commission has been seen as a major driving force behind further inte-
gration. However, given that member states appoint the members of the
Commission, its degree of autonomy has remained controversial. Is the
European Commission really a preference outlier?
Many studies contend that it is. In quite a few scholarly accounts, the
Commission is pictured as being much more in favour of further integration
and more liberal economically than the member states. Contrary to these
arguments, Hug (2003) and Crombez (1997) have doubted that substantial
differences can persist between the political preferences of the Commission
and the member states. By using the mechanisms of appointment and by
determining the extent of delegation, member states can keep the
Commission effectively under control (see also Pollack, 2003).
But do the member states really use the appointment of new Com-
missioners to exercise control over the Commission? To shed more light on
this question, we have to gain a better empirical understanding of the com-
position of the College of Commissioners. What are the criteria upon which
Commissioners are chosen? Does the College of Commissioners’ composition
reflect the distribution of preferences in the Council? Once we understand the
mechanisms behind appointments to the Commission, we can better dis-
tinguish whether bureaucratic drift is in fact the result of the composition of
the College or is caused by other processes.
Despite the considerable interest in the composition of the College of
Commissioners, few empirical studies have been conducted on it. Hooghe
(2001) analysed the factors that influence the preferences of high Commission
officials. MacMullen (1997) was the first to provide biographical information
on all Commissioners. Wonka (2004) linked the biographical information
about Commissioners’ previous careers to theoretical questions, as raised in
the principal–agent literature. He questioned the extent to which member
states use the appointment of Commissioners as a control device and
contended that member states can control the College of Commissioners quite
effectively via the appointment of loyal party members.
Valuable as these empirical studies are, several questions have remained
unanswered concerning the relationship between the political preferences of
EU member states and those of the Commissioners. One way to shed more
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light on the preferences of Commissioners is to determine the party linkage
of member states and the College of Commissioners. In this respect, two
questions are of particular theoretical importance: First, to what extent does
the party affiliation of Commissioners match the party composition of the
appointing government? Second, to what extent is the increase of the
Commission’s political importance reflected in the patterns of appointment
to the College of Commissioners? The following empirical analysis will
answer both questions.
My study contributes to the existing literature in several respects. Unlike
previous studies, I account systematically for the differences between large
and small member states regarding delegation to the College of Com-
missioners. Moreover, drawing on a new indicator that captures the relative
political importance of a prior political position – from state secretary to
prime minister – I am able to observe changes in the relative political import-
ance of appointed Commissioners. With this indicator I can analyse whether
member states have sent more high-ranking politicians to the College of
Commissioners in Brussels over time.
My analysis shows that, counter-intuitively, party affiliation has not
grown in importance as an appointment criterion. Instead, a stronger party
political alignment between member state governments and the College of
Commissioners is the by-product of a reduction in the number of Com-
missioners that larger member states can send to Brussels. However, member
states have increasingly appointed more important high-ranking politicians
as Commissioners, as is shown by the political position previously held by
each. In addition, the analysis shows that large and small member states differ
substantially in their appointment patterns.
The paper is divided into three sections. In the first part, I discuss
different theoretical perspectives on the role of the Commission and derive
empirical implications from this literature. Second, I present my empirical
analysis of the composition of the College of Commissioners and discuss the
results. I conclude by discussing my findings against the background of the
theoretical debate on delegation in the European Union.
The European Commission
The Commission’s position in the European Union
Rational choice institutionalists have always claimed that the Commission
plays an important role in EU policy-making (Steunenberg, 1994; Crombez,
1996). Contributions have focused on the ability of the Commission to
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influence legislation through agenda-setting. Three periods are usually dis-
tinguished to highlight the power of the Commission in the political system
of the EU. In the first period after the Treaty of Rome, the Commission’s power
was limited. With the Single European Act (SEA), the Commission’s agenda-
setting power gained in importance, but it was somewhat reduced by the
Treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, which introduced the co-decision
procedure (see Tsebelis and Garrett, 2001: 359). Given that the Commission
has the right to initiate legislation, it can use this power to shape the legis-
lative agenda.
However, the empirical studies on European law-making have focused
instead on the conditional agenda-setting power of the European Parliament
(EP) in the wake of George Tsebelis’s prominent article (1994). It was his
provocative claim that shaped the agenda for empirical research. Therefore,
more quantitative research has focused on the EP’s ability to act as an agenda-
setter than on the Commission’s role in the legislative process (see e.g. Tsebelis
et al., 2001). It seems as if the Commission’s important role in the legislative
process has been taken for granted as being rather uncontroversial.
Surprisingly little is known about the systematic differences in the
interests of the Commission and the member states over longer periods of
time. Most studies simply assume that the Commission and the EP have a
much more pro-European agenda than the member states in the Council. This
assumption would appear even more relevant given that critics have pointed
out the possibility of the Commission being even more powerful than the
agenda-setting models stipulate. For instance, Schmidt (2000) argues that 
the Commission not only may be able to choose the policy it prefers among
the positions of the member states but also might be able to change the
preferences of a member state by threatening to charge it with a treaty 
violation that would burden it with costly penalties. In addition, information
asymmetries provide the Commission with more bargaining leverage, because
it can put pressure upon member states in its role as the guardian of the
treaties.
The emphasis on information asymmetries comes close to neo-
functionalist accounts. From this perspective, high levels of uncertainty
provide an advantage for the Commission in EU legislation. Furthermore, in
neo-functionalist accounts the European Commission has more than formal
agenda-setting power. Here the Commission forms alliances with interest
groups to support policies that bolster further integration (Burley and Mattli,
1993: 54). It is the central role of the Commission and its detailed knowledge
of the treaties that place it in a more advantageous position vis-à-vis the
member states.
To sum up, the various theoretical approaches to European integration
agree that the European Commission plays a critical role in the political
European Union Politics 8(2)2 1 0
system of the EU, even though they differ in explaining how and why this is
so. For example, rational choice models of EU legislation emphasize the
formal agenda-setting power of the Commission after the SEA. According to
this view, the Commission’s role had been rather limited before this act.
However, scholars in the neo-functionalist tradition emphasize the central
role of the Commission as a motor of integration. Both approaches agree that
the political importance of the Commission has substantially increased over
time.
This increase in importance should also be mirrored in the assignment of
the Commissioners, but how? Is it reflected in the higher status of the
politicians appointed to the College of Commissioners or in a closer party
alignment between Commissioners and the appointing governments? Before
I address these questions, I will briefly discuss the relevant dimensions of
conflict in the political system of the European Union.
Dimensions of conflict in European politics
What are the issue dimensions relevant for EU politics? There is a consensus
concerning the basic dimensions of political conflict in European politics. The
literature usually distinguishes between the left/right and the integration/
sovereignty dimensions. These two dimensions have been shown to be
relevant both for political parties in Europe and for the party groups in the
European Parliament (see Ray, 1999; Gabel and Hix, 2002).
The extent to which the left/right divide determines decision-making in
the European Union has been analysed in a new wave of research. Hix et al.
(2005) show that left/right is a main explanatory variable for party group
coalitions in the European Parliament. Mattila (2004) provides evidence for
the salience of the left/right divide in the Council. Franchino (2007) has
offered the most extensive study of the party dynamics of European inte-
gration to date. He analyses decision-making in the EU by comparing the
party positions of the Council and the Commission on the left/right and
integration/sovereignty dimensions for the past five decades.
Although the study of party conflicts in the EU has recently become one
of the liveliest debates, almost nothing is known about party conflict in the
College of Commissioners. Understanding the party dynamics of the appoint-
ment process may constitute a valuable first step. Is the political location of
a member state government mirrored in the Commission? In other words, are
Commissioners chosen on the basis of their political affiliation? We would
expect party affiliation to be an important selection criterion for Com-
missioners. Yet, as we know, co-optation of the (major) opposition party by
granting it one of the two Commissioners has often been used as a strategy
to broaden support for EU policies and to remove the EU issue from domestic
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politics in the larger member states. Therefore, the empirical question is
whether the average political position of the Commission is closer to the
position taken by the member state parliaments or by member state govern-
ments. A more coherent understanding of the political dynamics influencing
the appointment of Commissioners will contribute significantly to our general
understanding of party conflict in the EU. It will allow us to better 
distinguish between different sources of bureaucratic drift, which I shall
address now.
Delegation to appointed agents
Pollack (2003: 103–7) argues that the Commission serves functions that
enhance the interest of EU member states. Treaty-based delegation has been
created to increase the credibility of the member state commitment to their
EU obligations. In particular, the substantial competence of the Commission
to bring infringement proceedings against non-compliant member states
highlights the Commission’s role as a guardian of the treaties. In addition to
asking why certain functions are delegated to the Commission, Pollack also
answers the question about the way in which the Commission is monitored
by the member states. In this context, comitology is perceived as a police
patrol mechanism, with which the member states monitor the Commission’s
activities (see also Franchino, 2000).
Besides comitology, Pollack (2003: 111–14) claims that member states also
monitor the Commission via appointments to it, particularly of the
Commission President. He claims that the appointment process is one of the
major mechanisms through which member states can influence the decision-
making of the Commission. He emphasizes that the member states are in full
control of the nomination and re-nomination of their Commissioners. Only
lately has the role of the European Parliament in the appointment process
been strengthened. Pollack highlights the fact that Commissioners are re-
appointed by their home countries or pursue a career in the domestic politics
of their homelands after having served on the Commission.
There have been attempts to clarify the relationship between the Council
and the Commission with the help of formal models. Crombez (1997: 7)
predicts that the policy preferences of a Commissioner should be similar to
the preferences of his or her domestic government. The main insight provided
by his model is that member states will appoint only those Commissioners
who are likely to initiate legislation that will find support in the Council.
Often the Commission is seen as a preference outlier that is much more
in favour of European integration than are the member states in the Council.
Drawing on Crombez, Hug (2003: 51) has taken issue with this common
assumption in the EU literature. He argues that, in the light of principal–agent
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theory, it is rather doubtful whether a major divide exists between the Council
and the Commission. Two arguments suggest that the Commission should
have preferences similar or close to those of the member states. First, since a
principal (here the member states) appoints an agent (the College of Com-
missioners), the preferences of the two should be related. Second, if there were
a major divergence between a principal and its agent, the principal should be
hesitant to delegate to the agent. Therefore, we should expect the Commission
to have preferences similar to those of the Council through two mechanisms
of control: the appointment process and the design of delegation.
To test these hypotheses empirically and to understand better what
accounts for bureaucratic drift, we have to focus on these two mechanisms.
On the one hand, we have to find out whether the member states do in fact
use the appointment of Commissioners as a means of control. To answer this
question, we need more information on the patterns of delegation to the
College. On the other hand, we have to find out whether Commissioners’
decisions reflect the preferences of the governments that appointed them.
Authors drawing strongly on organizational theory would say they do not.
Egeberg (2006), for example, theorizes about Commissioners’ behaviour and
identifies multiple roles that influence their decisions. Among the four roles
he suggests – Commission role, portfolio role, country role and party role –
only the last two can be easily manipulated by member states when they
nominate a new Commissioner.
To sum up, my theoretical discussion has been an attempt to understand
how the interests of the Council and the Commission differ by looking at the
appointment process and the Commission’s decision-making. There is a lively
debate on the degree to which the Commission’s actions reflect member
states’ interests. To understand better how these interests are interrelated we
have to find out how greatly the party political compositions of the Council
and the Commission differ. In the empirical section, I shall show that member
states use the appointment of Commissioners to delegate officials with similar
profiles to that of the domestic government.
Determinants of selection
Empirical studies of Commission preferences
What do we know about the Commission’s preferences so far? Liesbet
Hooghe’s work (2001) has substantially enhanced our understanding of the
European Commission. In her detailed qualitative and quantitative analysis
of the preferences of top Commission officials, Hooghe has shown which
kinds of factor shape the preferences. In her view, the Commission officials
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are influenced by the length of their previous national administrative
experience, the length of their work in the Commission, their party affiliation
and the position of their home country in the EU. As Hooghe argues, the
experience in the home country crucially shapes an official’s views.
Other studies have explicitly focused on the composition of the College
of Commissioners. MacMullen (1997) was – to the best of my knowledge –
the first to collect information on all Commissioners. In his study, he focused
on biographical aspects of the Commissioners such as age, gender and
education. MacMullen provides detailed summaries in which he shows how
biographical characteristics differ among Commissioners and indicates
patterns over time. The relation between Commission and Council prefer-
ences, however, was not of particular interest for this study. Magnette (2005:
80) demonstrates that the College of Commissioners has become more politi-
cal over time. Although he offers no information about the absolute number,
he shows an increase within the last 10–15 years in the number of Com-
missioners who held high political positions before their promotion to the
Commission.
A quantitative analysis of the College of Commissioners focusing on
theoretical questions has been provided by Wonka (2004). He is the first to
have studied the patterns on which the selection of European Commissioners
is based. Wonka is particularly interested to know how relevant party member-
ship is for the assignment of new Commissioners. In addition, he tries to assess
how much more frequently the Commissioners have been politicians rather
than bureaucrats. Wonka, like Hix (2005: 44–6), shows that over time most of
the Commissioners held political positions rather than strictly administrative
ones before they entered the Commission.
MacMullen and Wonka have made important contributions to an under-
studied aspect of the European Commission. My paper goes beyond their
analyses in several respects. First, my data set contains information on the
importance of the previous positions of European Commissioners so that I
can distinguish between the relative calibre of these positions. Second, using
multivariate statistics, I can better determine how much the importance of
party membership has increased and whether member states apply different
appointment strategies. In particular, controlling for incumbency, I can better
assess whether party affiliation has really become a more important appoint-
ment criterion over time. Before starting the empirical analysis, I will briefly
summarize the hypothesis to be tested.
Delegation to the Commission
If the relationship between member states and the Commission is perceived
to be a principal–agent game, we should expect that the principals (the
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member states) appoint agents (the Commissioners) with similar preferences.
Given that party affiliation is a good indicator of the ideological position of
a future Commissioner, it should be a relevant factor in the appointment
process. In other words, governments that want to ensure that their interests
are represented in the Commission should be more likely to nominate their
own party members as Commissioners.
H1: Commissioners are most likely to be members of parties that form the
domestic government at the time of appointment.
As discussed above, the practical and political importance of EU policies
has risen sharply over time. Most of the literature on legislation in the EU has
focused on the period after the SEA in 1987. This treaty gave the Commission
substantial agenda-setting power. This power was reduced by the treaties of
Maastricht and Amsterdam, but since the 1950s the Commission’s role in the
legislative process of the EU has become more important overall. This leads
to two further implications:
H2a: The congruence between the party affiliation of appointed Commissioners
and the party composition of the national governments should have become
stronger over time.
H2b: Countries have increasingly sent high-ranking politicians to Brussels; or the
political importance of Commissioners’ prior position has increased over time.
The literature also suggests that the interests of small member states differ
from those of large member states (see Pollack, 2001: 224). Small states rely on
international institutions for a ‘voice’, and international institutions are a more
efficient means for small states to express their interest than they are for large
states. Differences of interest evolve either from different positions in the world
economy or from the more limited state capacities of smaller states. For the
European Union, Thorhallsson has argued explicitly that small states relate to
the Commission differently from large states: ‘[D]ue to the limited capacity of
the administration of the smaller states, they rely more upon the Commission
to get their proposals through the Council’ (Thorhallsson, 2000: 114).
There is an institutional explanation that points in the same direction.
Until the Nice Treaty, bigger member states were allotted two Commissioners.
Starting with the Barroso Commission, only one Commissioner now repre-
sents every member state. This institutional feature may have generated
different delegation patterns between small and large member states. Since
small member states used to have only one seat in the College, they had less
leverage to ensure that their interests were represented. Therefore, small states’
governments should have an even stronger incentive to align their interests
with those of their Commissioners. The following implications can be derived
from these arguments.
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H3a: Small EU member states are more likely to send Commissioners with an
affiliation to the party in government.
H3b: Commissioners from smaller member states have held higher political office
at home than have Commissioners from larger member states.
I test these hypotheses with a data set that provides information on the
previous position of all Commissioners and their party affiliation. In the next
section I discuss the data, introduce the methods I have chosen and present
my empirical results.
Empirical analysis
Data
My data set contains information on all members of the College of Com-
missioners since 1958. Each Commissioner in every Commission is coded as
one observation (N = 218). For five Commissioners biographical information
was not available and for a few Commissioners information about their party
affiliation was lacking. My criterion for differentiating between small and
large member states is how many Commissioners the country is allowed to
send to the Commission. Small states are the ones with only one
Commissioner. The member states with two seats in the Commission – France,
Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom – are considered to be large
member states.1 Time is measured in years from 1958, when the first 
Hallstein Commission came into office. I also include a variable that indicates
whether a Commissioner is an incumbent and therefore was a member of the
previous Commission.
I use three different variables to measure the dimensions of change in the
composition of the Commission. First, I use an indicator that provides infor-
mation about the political importance of the highest position a Commissioner
held before he or she was appointed (cf. Druckman and Warwick, 2005).
Second, I use a variable that simply codes whether a Commissioner held a
political position before he or she entered the College of Commissioners.
Former positions like MP, MEP, junior ministers, ministers, and important
positions within a party are coded as being political ones. Third, I include
party affiliation as an additional variable. Let me describe these variables in
some more detail, starting with this last one.
The party affiliation was easily determined for most of the Com-
missioners. Some Commissioners were not formal party members but had
strong connections to one party in their previous career. Other Com-
missioners pursued a more independent political career. These were usually
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diplomats, administrators or policy experts. In the context of this paper, it is
of interest which party was in government at the time the Commissioner was
assigned. I distinguish three scenarios: first, a Commissioner has a strong
party connection and is affiliated with a party in government at the time he
or she takes office in the College of Commissioners; second, a Commissioner
has an affiliation with a national party that is presently in opposition; third,
the Commissioner has no direct party affiliation.
It is more difficult to account for the political importance of the position
that a given Commissioner held before he or she was nominated. Indexes that
have been developed within comparative politics can help assess the import-
ance of political positions. For example, researchers have been interested in
the way different ministries are divided among coalition partners. One way
to assess the political importance of government offices has been the use of
expert surveys. Two approaches figure prominently in the literature. Laver
and Hunt (1992: 105) use a ranking based on the importance of different
ministries. Experts were asked to rank portfolios according to their import-
ance, but without an underlying scale. The results from this survey show that
in almost all countries ‘finance’ and ‘foreign affairs’ are considered the two
most important portfolios. Recently, Druckman and Warwick (2005) also
conducted an expert survey to evaluate the importance of portfolios for West
European countries. Unlike Laver and Hunt, they asked country experts to
base their evaluation on a scale provided in the survey. The logic of the scale
is described by the authors in the following way:
In order to obtain interval-level ratings of these posts, we provided our re-
spondents with an anchor by asking them to apply a score of 1 to all posts whose
importance they believed equalled the ‘average’ or ‘normal’ portfolio. They were
then instructed that any post that is above average should receive a score above
1 that would reflect just how much more important it is than an average port-
folio (e.g., a score of 1.5 would indicate that the post is 50 per cent above average).
Likewise, any below-average post would receive a proportional score of less 
than 1 (Druckman and Warwick, 2005: 23).
I use the data set provided by Druckman and Warwick to compare the
previous position of Commissioners across countries and time. I took the
highest position that a person had reached in his or her career before he or
she entered the Commission and assigned to it the score for that position in
Druckman and Warwick’s scale. Unfortunately, the Druckman and Warwick
data set does not provide information for all member states or for all 
positions relevant to my context. Where values were unavailable, I assigned
values to positions. One might have additional reservations concerning the
use of the Druckman and Warwick data. The survey, conducted from 2000 to
2002, reports only one score for a ministry’s importance, even though the
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relevance of some ministries might have changed significantly over time. In
addition, cross-sectional comparability might be limited since experts may
apply different definitions of an average position. Still, it is the best source
available and, since information about the importance of Commissioners’
previous positions is crucial for a better understanding of delegation within
the EU, I make use of the Druckman and Warwick data in my subsequent
analysis.
Descriptive analysis
Let me start with some descriptive statistics. Table 1 provides information
about the party affiliation of Commissioners. Immediately we observe a
strong difference between Commissioners from small and large member
states. Although we find Commissioners who belong to parties both in office
and in opposition, some patterns emerge. First of all, small states have a
significantly higher percentage of Commissioners from governing parties
than from opposition parties. If we control for the incumbent status of a
Commissioner, we find that almost all Commissioners from small member
states who belong to a domestic opposition party have been incumbents. In
fact, only one non-incumbent Commissioner from a small state was identi-
fied as belonging to an opposition party – the first Finnish Commissioner,
Erkki Antero Liikanen.
However, several small states have sent Commissioners with no party
affiliation. For example, Luxembourg and Denmark have always sent either
members of the governing parties or persons with no party connection.
Greece and Portugal have sent only Commissioners with an affiliation to the
governing party. In general it seems as if the pattern has changed over time.
In the latest Commissions, almost no Commissioner of a small state had an
affiliation with an opposition party. This finding supports the expectation that
small states in particular will want to secure the preference alignment
between the domestic principal and the European agents in the Commission.
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Table 1 Party affiliation of Commissioners
Large states Small states
———————————— ————————————
Affiliation Total Incumbents Total Incumbents Total
Government 69 (33) 85 (22) 154
Opposition 31 (10) 7 (6) 38
None 8 (4) 8 (4) 16
The picture looks different when we analyse large member states. Here,
no general pattern emerges, although some trends and tendencies can be
depicted. Britain and Spain, for example, have always filled their two
Commission seats with one Commissioner from each of the two main parties,
Conservative/Labour and Partido Popular/Socialists, respectively. Germany
has usually sent Commissioners who were affiliated with one of the govern-
ing parties, but never a Commissioner without any party affiliation. For
France and Italy, no patterns can be found by simple data inspection. All in
all, the difference between small – one Commissioner – and large member
states is striking. Larger members sent opposition members much more often.
For the smaller members, almost all of the Commissioners with an affiliation
to an opposition party had been incumbents (see below for the multivariate
confirmation of this finding).
To assess the relative political importance of the previous position of an
EU Commissioner, I make use of a new data set that provides us with a
continuous measure for portfolio importance (see Druckman and Warwick,
2005). I use the Commission Presidents to demonstrate how positions are
translated into ‘importance scores’ and thereby help explain better the
measure applied here. Table 2 shows the highest previous position held by
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Table 2 Prior positions of Commission Presidents
Year President Highest prior position Scorea Averageb
1958 Walter Hallstein (D) Junior minister 0.84 0.55
1962 Hallstein II (Foreign affairs) 0.62
1967 Jean Rey (B) Minister of economic affairs 1.02 0.53
1970 Franco Maria Minister of state participation 1.18 0.52
Malfatti (I) in industry 
1972 Sicco Mansholt (NL) Minister of agriculture 0.74 –
1973 Francis-Xavier Minister of economy 1.92 0.68
Ortoli (F) and finance 
1977 Roy Jenkins (UK) Chancellor of the Exchequer 1.64 0.84
1981 Gaston Thorn (L) Prime minister 2.17 0.95
1985 Jacques Delors (F) Minister of economy 1.92 0.80
1989 Delors II and defence 1.00
1993 Delors III 1.01
1995 Jacques Santer (L) Prime minister 2.75 1.07
2000 Romano Prodi (I) Prime minister 2.48 0.94
2004 Jose Manuel Barroso (P) Prime minister 2.20 1.23
Sources: Munzinger archive and Druckman and Warwick (2005).
a Position score for Commission President’s highest prior position.
b Average position score of all Commissioners in Commission.
each Commission President. In addition, it shows the score assigned to these
positions and the average position score of the Commission headed by the
respective President. Keeping in mind that this scale of portfolio importance
might provide us with a rough and basic measure only, we still can use this
scale to depict trends and tendencies.
Table 2 suggests that there has been a substantial increase in the import-
ance of the previous political positions held by Commission Presidents.
Whereas the first President had formerly been a junior minister, subsequent
Presidents had held a ministerial portfolio, often for the most important
national ministries. Lately, Commission Presidents have been former prime
ministers. In addition, all Commission Presidents were members of a party
that was in government in their home country.2
This observation is in line with the expectation that the heightened
importance of the Commission should be reflected in the importance of
Commissioners’ previous positions. The box plot in Figure 1 provides
additional support for this hypothesis. It shows that the importance of the
previous positions of Commissioners has increased over time. Both the
median of the position scores and the highest position held by a
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Figure 1 Box plot of former positions (scores) of Commissioners.
Commissioner have risen. In addition, we see that the frequency of Com-
missioners in the lowest quartile has dropped. Commissioners with no
previous political experience are given a score of 0.2, and Figure 1 shows that
this group provided a significant number of Commissioners in the early years.
The Barroso Commission, in contrast, has no member from this group.
The data clearly confirm our expectation. An increasing importance of
the Commission is reflected in more powerful political actors delegated to the
College of Commissioners over time. To analyse this link further, I continue
with a multivariate analysis that enables me to control for additional factors
such as incumbency and national background.
Multivariate analysis
In studying the changing composition of the Commission, I use three differ-
ent indicators: first, the highest position held by a Commissioner – in other
words, the position score; second, whether he or she had been in a political
position before; and, third, the person’s party affiliation at the time he or she
was appointed to the Commission. Methodologically, these three variables
are of different types and require different multivariate models. Party affili-
ation is coded as a categorical variable and has to be analysed with a multi-
nomial logit model. Whether a Commissioner has held a political position
before is coded through a dummy variable and analysed with a logit model.
An ordinary least squares (OLS) model is used to analyse the position scores
of the Commissioners. The results of the analysis are shown in Table 3. I
present a more in-depth discussion of these models in the following sections.
To find out how the factors that I have discussed – incumbency and
country size – are interrelated with other factors, I present the results of a
multivariate analysis. Based on the three categories for party affiliation –
member of government party, opposition member, no party affiliation – I
conducted a multinomial logit regression in which each category is compared
with a reference group.
Model 1 of Table 3 presents the results of this analysis. It indicates that
there is in fact a strong difference between EU members with only one repre-
sentative in the College of Commissioners and large member states with two
Commission members. Commissioners with an affiliation to a domestic party
in the opposition are less likely to be from smaller states. The results show
also that, contrary to the theoretical expectations, Commissioners are not more
likely to be members of governing parties over time. There is some evidence
that the number of Commissioners with no party affiliation has decreased.
To shed more light on the political dimension of a Commissioner’s
previous career, I conducted a further analysis. I divided all Commissioners
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into two groups – politicians and Commissioners who had held no previous
political positions. This variable separates politicians from Commissioners
who previously had neither parliamentarian nor ministerial positions and
therefore no politically relevant positions. Model 2 of Table 3 displays the
results of the logit analysis. It can be seen that Commissioners have been less
likely to be in non-political positions over time. To illustrate the result of the
logit analysis I have calculated the predicted values over time.3 Figure 2
shows the results of this analysis. The figure illustrates that the probability
that a Commissioner was in a political position before he or she took office
in Brussels has increased sharply over time. In addition, the model predicts
that almost half of the early Commissioners had never before held a political
position. The graph also reveals a significant difference, decreasing over time,
between small and large member states.
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Table 3 Determinants of party affiliation and previous positions of Commissioners
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
GLM – Model Multinomial logita Logitb OLS
Dependent variable Opposition No Political Position 
partyc party position scored
Years since 1958 0.012 –0.039 1.067 0.011
(0.78) (1.95)* (4.25)*** (3.72)***
Incumbent Commissioner –0.656 0.151 0.697 –0.091
(1.44) (0.20) (0.93) (–1.18)
Country with one seat –3.711 –0.211 3.259 0.332
(3.52)*** (0.28) (2.65)*** (4.20)***
One seat and incumbent 3.528 0.786 
(2.94)*** (0.73) 
Constant –0.829 –1.430 0.473
(1.77)* (2.27)** (5.21)***
N 208 213 213
Likelihood ratio χ2 36.41 37.01
Pseudo-R2 (McFadden) 0.12 0.18
R2 0.19
Sources: Munzinger archive and LexisNexis for biographical information of commissioners.
Software: Stata 9.2 and R 2.3.
Notes: Absolute value of z-statistics (logit models) and t-statistics (OLS) in parentheses.
a Reference category: Commissioners who were affiliated with a party in government.
b Odds ratios shown; reference category: Commissioners that held no political position before.
c Government status of Commissioner’s party from Woldendorp et al. (2000).
d Source: Druckman and Warwick (2005).
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
For small member states, the results confirm insights gained from the
descriptive data analysis. First, if a Commissioner is a member of a domestic
opposition party, he or she is most likely to have once been a member of the
Commission. Second, the number of Commissioners with no party affiliation
has decreased over time. The multivariate analysis also shows almost no
changes in the party affiliation of Commissioners over time with respect to
government/opposition status. Contrary to an often held view in the
literature, Commissioners are not more likely to be government party
members over time. This latter finding contradicts some of the expectations
I raised in the first part of the paper.
The effect of the finding changed through the institutional reform of the
College of Commissioners in the Nice Treaty. Now every member state has
one seat in the College of Commissioners. Given that countries with only one
seat in the College delegate politicians from the governing parties as Com-
missioners, we find a closer similarity between the parties in the Council and
those in the College of Commissioners.
Let me now turn to an analysis of the calibre of previous positions. The
advantage of measuring the significance of previous positions as discussed
above is that it provides a continuous scale with which to compare different
positions held by Commissioners before they entered the Commission. In the
analysis, I determine the influence of time and nation size on a country’s
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Figure 2 Predicted probability of having a political position.
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delegation behaviour with the help of an OLS regression.4 The increased
importance of the Commission should be reflected in the fact that persons
with higher political positions take office over time. In addition, I expect that
especially small states have a strong interest in the European Commission.
Therefore, they should send persons who have held higher political positions
than those previously held by Commissioners from larger member states.
The results of the analysis are presented in Model 3 of Table 3. Generally,
they confirm the implications drawn from the delegation literature. Some
further discussion helps to clarify the implications of these results and the
general performance of the model. To understand the results, we should 
keep in mind that the scale measuring the importance of previous positions
can be divided into four categories. The highest category consists of former
prime ministers and the most important national portfolios, the second
category of average ministers, the third category of junior ministers and less
important ministries, and the last category of almost all other, primarily non-
governmental, positions (MPs, diplomats, policy experts, etc.). Given that each
of these categories consists of a range of about 0.4, we can infer from the re-
gression results that the Commissioners’ previous positions have shifted from
those of former junior ministers and non-governmental positions – especially
diplomats – to those of governmental experience in average ministries.
Looking at the results of the regression analysis, we are surprised to see
how significantly more high-profile politicians have been assigned as
Commissioners by smaller member states. It is not so much the finding as
such but the strength of the finding that catches our attention. Again consider-
ing the data in categorical terms, we note that, on average, smaller member
states have delegated Commissioners one category above larger member
states. More precisely, the data show us that larger member states were still
sending junior ministers and MPs at a time when smaller member states were
already sending former ministers to the Commission.
To sum up, the finding that the importance of delegates to the College of
Commissioners has increased over time reflects the more important role of
the Commission. More surprising is the fact that small states seem to delegate
persons with a significantly higher profile than do the larger member states.
It is not necessarily surprising that this is statistically significant, but it is more
surprising with respect to the scope of this influence.
Conclusion
Commissioners are usually members of governing parties, and the increased
importance of the Commission over time is reflected in the previous
positions of EU Commissioners. Contrary to the arguments discussed in the
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theoretical section of this article, it cannot be statistically shown that the
importance of a Commissioner’s party affiliation has increased over time. It
has been a constant pattern that most of the Commissioners are members of
parties in domestic governments. As long as bigger member states delegated
two Commissioners, one of them was often an opposition member. Only the
number of Commissioners with no party affiliation has decreased. The
increased political role of the Commission is represented in the previous
positions of the Commissioners rather than in their party affiliation.
In the study, I reveal two patterns of delegation to the Commission that
require more detailed investigation in the future. First, why do appointment
strategies vary so significantly between small and large member states?
Second, and partly related to the former, how can substantial differences in
patterns of delegation among large member states be explained? The del-
egation behaviour of some large member states follows a principal–agent
logic – these countries assign Commissioners from governing parties. In
contrast, other states regularly include opposition members. These differences
can hardly be explained in the light of principal–agent theory without includ-
ing domestic factors. More comparative work investigating the appointment
process may help to reveal these domestic factors.
Detailed knowledge of the appointment process is a first step toward a
better understanding of delegation to the Commission and of possible sources
of bureaucratic drift. It sheds new light on the distribution of interests
between the Commission and the Council. In my view, two further steps are
necessary for a more coherent understanding of bureaucratic drift. First, we
have to find out how the allocation of portfolios in the Commission influ-
ences decision-making in the College. A member state government may try
to guarantee its influence in the Commission not only by appointing loyal
delegates but also by securing a portfolio that is of special interest to the
country.5 Currently, we do not know enough about the logic of portfolio allo-
cation in the College to investigate this link further. Second, we have to find
out the extent to which Commissioners’ decisions reflect their domestic
parties’ positions or those of their home countries. What is the linkage
between national governments and Commissioners after the appointment of
a new Commission? A broad literature based on organizational studies claims
that the link is rather weak and that bureaucratic drift results from social-
ization in office. On both issues – the relevance of the portfolio allocation and
the actual decisions of Commissioners – we still lack a comprehensive empiri-
cal understanding that would help us to discriminate between different theor-
etical explanations of bureaucratic drift. Having outlined the patterns of
appointment to the College of Commissioners, I hope that this study provides
insights for future research on the issue.
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Notes
For comments and suggestions I am grateful to Michael Blauberger, Christian
Breunig, Morten Egeberg, Philipp Rehm, Armin Schäfer, Julia Sievers and three
anonymous reviewers. I especially thank Philip Manow for feedback on earlier
drafts.
1 In the current Barroso Commission all member states are allowed to send
only one Commissioner. Neither the exclusion of the Barroso Commission
from the quantitative analysis nor its inclusion affects my results.
2 Malfatti resigned as President in 1972 to run for office in Italy. Sicco Mansholt,
previously a Vice-President, took the position for the rest of the term. At the
time, the Dutch social democrats (PvDA) were not part of government in the
Netherlands.
3 For the calculation, the incumbent status is set to 0. Therefore the pre-
dicted values on which the graph is based give probabilities for new
Commissioners.
4 To evaluate the robustness of my analysis, I also analysed my regression
results through a multinomial logit model. For this analysis I divided all
previous positions into four groups and analysed how the composition
changed over time. This analysis leads to the same results as the normal
regression. Since the latter is easier to interpret, I present only these results
here.
5 I owe this idea to an anonymous reader.
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